I. INTRODUCTION
The end of apartheid, together with the introduction of a democratic constitution, was good reason for taking South Africa's indigenous systems of customary law more seriously. Although early calls to "Africanise" the legal system were not achieved, one small concession was made to the country's African legal heritage. For the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept was adopted into the general law of the land: ubuntu.
In many ways, this was an exceptional event. Since the colonial conquest of Africa, the indigenous normative orders have been treated as inferior. At best, they were tolerated in terms of such monitoring devices as the so-called "repugnancy clauses"; 1 at worst, they were dismissed as mere custom, not law.
2 South Africa's new constitutional dispensation had the effect of formally elevating customary law to the same status as that of the common law, Rather than continue this search, this paper looks at function, i.e., the ways in and purposes for which a word is being used. Such an analysis steers clear of priori meanings, and concentrates instead on why and how a word is currently being used. Functionalism assumes that meaning is malleable. In other words, it acknowledges that users are continually exploiting terms to serve their own particular ends.
In this regard, it must be appreciated that, as a loanword, ubuntu falls into a category of terms that is especially susceptible to manipulation. As a newcomer to a strange environment, ubuntu must fit in with existing terms and concepts. 8 In turn, its appearance affects the meanings of other words, setting up a relationship between words, their users, and meanings that is dynamic and changing. 4 . In South Africa, the term "common law" is generally used in opposition to African customary law. It denotes the systems of Roman-Dutch and English law that were imported during the colonial period and, in this sense, includes judicial precedents and legislative enactments, both colonial and post-colonial. 5. A calque or translation implies that the meaning is borrowed rather than the foreign word itself, which would be a "loanword."
6. See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at ¶ 307 (S. Afr.). 7. Cf. Yvonne Mokgoro, Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998) (stating that the Western use of abstractions "defies the very essence of the African world-view," which describes ideas through real contexts).
8. As a loanword in English, ubuntu "is highly susceptible to change, not only because it is novel, but also because it is isolated"; its links with the language from which it was borrowed are broken, and it has no semantic connections with other words in the language into which it has been absorbed. 
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II. USES OF UBUNTU
An obvious place at which to start an inquiry into the use of ubuntu is the history of its usage. At the outset, however, we must accept that it is impossible to trace the exact denotation of the term in its vernacular origins. According to a famous metaphor, ubuntu is said to be shrouded in a "kaross of mystery." 9 Nevertheless, we do know that ubuntu is in the everyday parlance of many African languages, especially those of the Nguni group.
10
The word seems to have been co-opted to a nationwide public discourse in South Africa during the 1920s, when the Zulu cultural movement, Inkatha, used it as a catch-all slogan for a program to revive respect for traditional Zulu values.
11
From there, the term was introduced to the discourses of theology, management, and commerce, where it is now widely used to name companies, services, and consumer goods. As cynics put it, ubuntu has provided a useful means for packaging products in the appearance of traditional African values.
12
Somewhat later in this process, ubuntu entered the law. A small, but telling, clause in the "postamble" to the 1993 Interim Constitution provided that the deeply divided society that was emerging from apartheid bore a "legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge." Nevertheless, ubuntu has been used to give voice to something clearly African and to incorporate the values of the majority of the population "into the legal system so as to form a cohesive, plural, South African legal culture."
16

A. PUBLIC LAW
Ubuntu has played its most prominent role in public law. Not only did the Interim Constitution provide the foundation for a new South African society, but it was also the first official document to use the term. This single word then provided the courts with a point of entry for introducing principles of reconciliation, sharing, compassion, civility, and harmony.
Indeed, the success of the country's constitutional revolution rested on reconciliation, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) played a critical role in facilitating this process.
17
Ubuntu was expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Act constituting the TRC, 18 the chair of the Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, deliberately invoked it so as to suggest an African idea of justice. 
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20
Forgiveness-or rather amnesty for apartheid offenses-lay at the heart of the truth and reconciliation process. 21 In AZAPO v. TRC, however, it was argued that the removal of civil and criminal liability was unconstitutional because it infringed the right of access to the courts.
22
The Constitutional Court, nonetheless, held that amnesty was essential because without it there would have been no incentive for offenders to disclose the truth, and as the truth unfolded, so would the healing process of reconciliation.
23
While ubuntu was key to achieving the immediate goal of political settlement, it continued to play an important, long-term role in the criminal justice system. Here, it provides a rubric for infusing African ideas of dispute resolution into sentencing policy. Even before the new Constitution, the courts were experimenting with the idea of restorative justice (which, of course, was central to the work of the TRC). Afr.) (describing, in an obiter dictum, the valuable features of customary law: an inherent flexibility, consensus-seeking in family meetings for the prevention and resolution of disputes, the unity of the family structures, the "fostering of co-operation, a sense of responsibility in and of belonging to its members," and "the nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions such as ubuntu"). Loyola Law Review [Vol. 57
follows:
Metaphorically, [ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality.
Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. It is a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community [that] such person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and coresponsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all. 27 Social harmony lies at the heart of ubuntu. When applied to criminal justice, this value upends the traditional common-law goal of sentencing, which, generally speaking, aims at retribution. Restorative justice seeks instead to promote social cohesion. justice system for children who are in conflict with the law, while ensuring their responsibility and accountability for crimes committed." 31 Hence, courts are required, as far as possible, to divert juvenile offenders from the penal system. 32 For example, in M v. S, which dealt with correctional supervision, the court called for crime control to be returned to the community rather than criminal justice agencies. 33 It commented that the offender would have a better chance of social rehabilitation without suffering the negative effects of a prison sentence, loss of a job, and possible destruction of family networks. 34 Although an important factor in sentencing, ubuntu has made only a brief appearance in substantive criminal law. The only case in which it was mentioned is S v. Mandela.
35
Here the accused pleaded compulsion, but could not prove that the compulsion was immediate or life-threatening. In holding that lower standards could not be accepted for this defense, the court remarked that we now live in a society based on freedom, dignity, ubuntu, and respect for life. Implicit in the idea of ubuntu was the principle that every person should be treated with equal concern and respect. with business left unfinished by the TRC, namely, a form of amnesty for individuals who had not taken part in the TRC process. To solve this problem, the President announced a special pardon for those who had committed politically motivated offenses. As to whether victims were to be given a voice in this special dispensation, the Constitutional Court held that their participation was essential, partly to establish the truth and partly to achieve national reconciliation.
38
It observed that, in Africa, " [v] ictim participation was the norm in deciding the proper 'punishment' for offenders in traditional African society" and "this remarkable tradition of participation and capacity for forgiveness in African society also underlay, at a deeper level, the amnesty process." Ball 1993) , who said that, in traditional society, "the hospitality universally enjoined towards strangers, [is] captured in the Xhosa proverb: Unyawo alunompumlo ('the foot has no nose'). Strangers, being isolated from their kin, and thus defenceless, were particularly under the protection of the chief and were accorded special privileges."). This legislation aims to alleviate the plight of the homeless and those forced to seek shelter on property owned by another. To achieve a just and equitable settlement, it requires the courts to consider the lawfulness of the squatters' occupation and their interests and circumstances, together with broader constitutional values. Hence, although the claims of property owners may be based on sound legal grounds, they may be refused to realize higher values. These have been variously described as justice, equity, fairness, grace, and compassion. 55 The leading case, and the prime example of the application of ubuntu with regard to PIE, is Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers.
56
In response to a petition signed by 1600 people in the neighborhood, the Municipality sought an eviction order against sixty-eight people who, for a number of years, had been occupying shacks on privately owned land within the municipal area.
57
Justice Sachs appealed to ubuntu in the terms quoted above, namely, that we are not islands unto ourselves, but 57. Justice Sachs held the following: "PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and to promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern." Id. at ¶ 37.
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58
Hence, while PIE emphasizes justice and equity, these values are to be seen as "interactive, complementary and mutually reinforcing" with equality and the rule of law.
59
One might have thought that the law of delict would provide fertile ground for ubuntu since it is based on such indeterminate concepts as reasonableness and the duty of care. Surprisingly, however, ubuntu has had little effect in this branch of the law.
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security
60
is a good example. In Carmichele, the courts had to decide whether the state owed the applicant a duty of care. While the Constitutional Court could well have referred to ubuntu jurisprudence to answer this question, it held that adjustments to the common law should be based on an "objective normative value system" reflecting underlying constitutional values, 61 without deciding the actual content of that system.
62
The only case in delict to have applied ubuntu was Dikoko v. Mokhatla, 63 but it involved a remedy rather than the substantive law. Justice Mokgoro held that monetary compensation for defamation diverted attention away from two basic considerations: that the reparation represents injury to dignity and reputation, not necessarily to the pocket; and that courts should attempt to reestablish a respectful relationship between the parties.
64
A Roman-Dutch law remedy, the amende honorable (apology), was therefore revived to acknowledge a sense of ubuntu and to emphasize restorative rather than retributive justice. Second, it can be argued that, to deal with the type of problems for which ubuntu has been argued, the common law already has specific mechanisms in place, notably, the principles of good faith, public policy, and, of course, the Bill of Rights.
One such common-law mechanism used to be the exceptio doli generalis, a remedy that was formerly invoked as a defense to the enforcement of terms in contracts that were unfair or unconscionable.
67
In Bank of Lisbon v. De Ornelas, 68 however, the former Appellate Division decided that the exceptio did not form part of our law. According to Joubert JA., it had disappeared in the Middle Ages and, as a "superfluous defunct anachronism," should be laid to rest. Its place was then taken by public policy, good faith, and the Bill of Rights.
While the courts have occasionally mentioned ubuntu in typical private-law relationships, ). This claim was found to be an abuse of the parents' generosity. The court spoke of the wife's claim as "an irresistible temptation of greed," and added, "her attitude undermined ubuntu, that godly value with which all human beings are ordained." Id.
transformative, communitarian power of the "constitutional values of freedom, equality and dignity."
73
C. UBUNTU: AN AFRICAN EQUITY
From the cases above, it appears that the courts are using ubuntu as a metanorm to solve problems where there is no hard and fast rule to determine the outcome. In such situationssentencing and administrative decision-making being the most obvious-ubuntu functions as a means for reaching an equitable solution.
In fact, ubuntu bears a close resemblance to the English-law doctrine of equity. This, too, was a metanorm, albeit one invoked for a somewhat different reason: to correct injustices resulting from strict application of the common law. 74 Hence, by appealing to equity, English judges could contrive fairer results in particular factual scenarios. 75 In this manner, the doctrine of equity was called upon "to regulate the conscience of defendants so that they act[ed] with propriety in situations where, by following the letter of the common law, they could act unconscionably." 76 As the latter quote indicates, the history of equity in English law was connected to good conscience and, ultimately, religion. In fact, courts of equity were originally presided over by the Lord Chancellor, the chief Minister of the King's Court. , linked ubuntu to PIE and, through that means, to justice and equity. As a result, "[t]he court is called upon to go beyond its normal functions, and to engage in active judicial management according to equitable principles of an ongoing, stressful and law-governed social process." Id. He went on to say the following:
The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it difficult for the courts to ensure immediate present-day equity at the micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself correct all the systemic unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and minimise the degree of injustice and inequity which the eviction of the weaker parties in conditions of inequality of necessity entails. 79 and, as a result, the development of equity in English law owed much to canon law. 80 This origin in religion has an interesting parallel with ubuntu, which also finds its ultimate sanction in the spiritual realm, namely, the departed ancestors who stand as guardians of the African moral order. 81 The question now arises whether ubuntu will continue to play a productive role as a norm of equity. After all, comparative law teaches that legal transplants will not survive if they prove to be superfluous to the needs of their new environment. This argument is confirmed by linguistic theory.
Id
From an English language perspective, ubuntu is a so-called "loan" word. 82 This qualifier implies a word taken from another language to denote a phenomenon that has never before been given expression in its new environment (or possibly a phenomenon that already has many terms of expression). As a loan word, ubuntu "is a solution to a problem. Often the need is obvious, but sometimes it is unseen or barely felt, and then it is only in finding something to plug the gap that we actually realize the gap was there in the first place." 83 Even so, ubuntu is an intruder, l'emprunt est un intrus, 84 and, as such, will have to adapt to its new environment. 85 
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informative and controlling functions through established rules of contract law," it may not be used directly to intervene in contractual relationships. 96 In such circumstances, the courts must refer, instead, to the established rules in order to preserve legal certainty. 97 In summary, although good faith is an aspect of ubuntu, it is not used in situations where the courts readily apply ubuntu. 98 Public policy would, at first sight, seem to embrace equity and fairness, since it stands for "the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion." 99 Even so, this principle is not the same as ubuntu. While policy is mutable, in that it is always changing in response to social demands, ubuntu is constant and timeless.
Moreover, public policy does not have an unlimited scope of operation. " [S] imple justice between man and man" in the parties' individual capacities cannot alone determine the public interest, because the idea is too simplistic and could lead to arbitrary decisions. 100 Indeed, rather than relying only on public policy to deal with unfair situations in contract, the courts seem to prefer linking it to the Bill of Rights. 101 In Barkhuizen v. Napier, 102 for instance, the court held that "the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights." 103 Thus, although we can say that policy is informed by ubuntu, the converse is not necessarily
